δ-Dependency for privacy-preserving XML data publishing  by Landberg, Anders H. et al.
Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 77–94Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Biomedical Informatics
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /y jb ind-Dependency for privacy-preserving XML data publishinghttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbi.2014.01.013
1532-0464/ 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc.
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: anders.h.landberg@gmail.com (A.H. Landberg), kinh.nguyen@
latrobe.edu.au (K. Nguyen), e.pardede@latrobe.edu.au (E. Pardede), w.rahayu@
latrobe.edu.au (J.W. Rahayu).
URLs: http://www.latrobe.edu.au/scitecheng/about/staff/proﬁle?uname=
K2Nguyen (K. Nguyen), http://homepage.cs.latrobe.edu.au/ekpardede/ (E. Pardede),
http://homepage.cs.latrobe.edu.au/jwrahayu/ (J.W. Rahayu).
1 http://www.hl7.org.Anders H. Landberg ⇑, Kinh Nguyen, Eric Pardede, J. Wenny Rahayu
Department of Computer Science and Computer Engineering, La Trobe University, Victoria 3086, Australia
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c tArticle history:
Received 25 August 2013
Accepted 28 January 2014
Available online 8 February 2014
Keywords:
Medical privacy
XML
Hierarchy
Dissection
Privacy-preserving healthcare dataAn ever increasing amount of medical data such as electronic health records, is being collected, stored,
shared and managed in large online health information systems and electronic medical record systems
(EMR) (Williams et al., 2001; Virtanen, 2009; Huang and Liou, 2007) [1–3]. From such rich collections,
data is often published in the form of census and statistical data sets for the purpose of knowledge shar-
ing and enabling medical research. This brings with it an increasing need for protecting individual people
privacy, and it becomes an issue of great importance especially when information about patients is
exposed to the public.
While the concept of data privacy has been comprehensively studied for relational data, models and
algorithms addressing the distinct differences and complex structure of XML data are yet to be explored.
Currently, the common compromise method is to convert private XML data into relational data for pub-
lication. This ad hoc approach results in signiﬁcant loss of useful semantic information previously carried
in the private XML data. Health data often has very complex structure, which is best expressed in XML. In
fact, XML is the standard format for exchanging (e.g. HL7 version 31) and publishing health information.
Lack of means to deal directly with data in XML format is inevitably a serious drawback.
In this paper we propose a novel privacy protection model for XML, and an algorithm for implementing
this model. We provide general rules, both for transforming a private XML schema into a published XML
schema, and for mapping private XML data to the new privacy-protected published XML data. In addition,
we propose a new privacy property, d-dependency, which can be applied to both relational and XML data,
and that takes into consideration the hierarchical nature of sensitive data (as opposed to ‘‘quasi-identi-
ﬁers’’). Lastly, we provide an implementation of our model, algorithm and privacy property, and perform
an experimental analysis, to demonstrate the proposed privacy scheme in practical application.
 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc.1. Introduction
Broadly speaking, there are two distinct approaches to privacy
protection. One is the access-control approach, which seeks to
protect privacy by controlling access to the data; and the other is
the privacy preservation approach, which manipulates the data,
by various privacy preservation techniques, before publishing the
data for public use. The latter is the subject matter of this paper.
Privacy preservation is obviously an important consideration when
making medical data available beyond controlled boundaries, such
as data exchange between EMR’s (Williams et al., 2001; Virtanen,2009; Huang and Liou, 2007) [1–3], as it may contain comprehen-
sive sensitive information about patients. What these forms of data
publishing have in common is that they all provide data collections
that associate individuals with information relevant to these indi-
viduals. Some of the published information may be sensitive and it
should not be possible to link it to a speciﬁc individual in the data.
In response to this requirement, a large research community has
evolved and many approaches have been proposed to protect indi-
viduals’ privacy in the data.
Numerous approaches for privacy preservation in the relational
domain have been proposed, most notably for publishing microda-
ta [4–8] and transactional data [9–12]. But few approaches have
been proposed for the XML domain and investigated what issues
arise by doing so. Papers that address XML are mostly based on
access-control techniques. Regarding access control for XML, it is
useful to note that a vast amount of work has been carried out as
it poses unique challenges when applying access control speciﬁc
concepts to the semistructured, hierarchical and complex structure
of the XML format [13–19].
78 A.H. Landberg et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 77–94As for privacy preservation through data modiﬁcation, typically
it is assumed that XML can be ﬂattened to relational data and then
any conventional privacy scheme can be applied. By ‘‘ﬂattening’’
we mean mapping data from a hierarchical to a relational format.
But medical data, in most cases, contain very rich, and therefore
complex, semantics. A reading of blood pressure, for example,
may depend on where in the body it is measured, which point in
time in the cardiac cycle it is taken (systolic and diastolic arterial
blood pressures), which instrument is used, and so on. Such rich
semantics can be conveniently expressed in XML. Hence, it is no
surprise that XML has been selected as the standard format for
medical data exchange, as pointed out in the abstract. In light of
these facts, the ‘‘ﬂattening XML to relational’’ assumption, from
the practical viewpoint, is untenable: the ﬂattening process is la-
bour-intensive and the loss of semantics is signiﬁcant.
While medical data publishing is typically intended for useful
purposes such as research, statistical analysis and data mining, it
is inevitable that the data will be shared with the wrong people.
Vaidya et. al. deﬁne data privacy as freedom from unauthorised
intrusion [20]. This deﬁnition is quite general in nature and leaves
it open as to what unauthorised intrusion actually means. In pri-
vacy preservation approaches, it is interpreted as a privacy breach
where an individual and their associated information can success-
fully be identiﬁed within the data, assuming that unique identiﬁers
have been removed from the data already.
Based on this key objective to protect individuals’ personal
information in published data, we seek to analyse and investigate
key issues in protecting XML data for privacy. In a nutshell, we seek
to extend the well-known approach of Anatomy [6], which was
proposed for relational data, for direct application to XML data.
For relational data, concepts such as QI (quasi-identiﬁer) and SI
(sensitive data) are easy to deﬁne in theory, and QI and SI data
are easy to extract in practice (at least prior to the application of
techniques to achieve k-anonymity, l-diversity, etc.). For XML data,
as can be expected, those equivalent tasks present various interest-
ing challenges. This paper will address those arising issues from
both the theoretical and practical viewpoints.
In addition, we propose the novel concept of d-dependency. This
concept is to deal with the problem of hierarchical sensitive data,
which arises in situations where sensitive data values are taken
from a hierarchical tree structure, with the concepts signiﬁed by
data values become more speciﬁc as we move down the tree. For
an exposition of the problem of hierarchical sensitive data in the
context of relational data, see Personalized Privacy Preservation
[21]. The concept of d-dependency can be applied to both relational
and XML data. In this paper, we will present an algorithm to illus-
trate how d-dependency can be incorporated into the transforma-
tion of XML data for privacy preservation. We will also present
the results of several experiments to illustrate the effectiveness
of d-dependency for privacy preservation purpose.
Our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 makes four separate
contributions and proposes new methods as part of our privacy
protection approach: Section 2.1 proposes a novel method for the
construction of an XML schema for published data (XML schema
transformation). Section 2.2 proposes a new method for the(a) The microdata (b) The quasi-identi
Fig. 1. Privacy using Anatomyproduction of published data (XML data mapping). Section 2.3 pro-
poses a new privacy property, d-dependency that can be applied to
both relational and XML data, and that takes into consideration the
hierarchical nature of data, which is also common to XML. Sec-
tion 2.4 proposes a new algorithm that implements our privacy
model, dissection technique and d-dependency privacy property.
In Section 3, we provide an experimental analysis to benchmark
the proposed privacy scheme against a well-proven privacy meth-
od (Anatomy) and in practical application. Sections 4 and 5 provide
a discussion of the results and draw conclusions.
2. Methods
Anatomy’s process of transforming private data to published
data can be conceived of as consisting of two major tasks: dissec-
tion and grouping. The purpose of dissection is to separate QI data
from SI data, and the purpose of grouping is to achieve the desired
privacy property, for example, l-diversity.
In the relational domain, the ﬁrst task is trivial, especially for
microdata tables. Given a private relational schema, all we need
to do is to specify which attributes are QI attributes and which
are SI attribute, and immediately we know what the published
relational schema should look like. As an example, consider the
one shown in Fig. 1, which is taken from the Anatomy paper [6].
The ﬁrst table is the private data, and the last two tables, QIT
and SIT, are the result of applying dissection and diversiﬁcation
on the ﬁrst table. In this example, attributes Age, Sex and Zip code
are QI attributes, and Disease is an SI attribute. The separation of
QI from SI data is simple: once we specify Age, Sex and Zip code
as QI attributes and Disease as SI attribute, we immediately have
the structures for the QIT and SIT tables, and the separation per
se is effectively done. With hardly doing any work, we can directly
proceed to the task of grouping (diversiﬁcation). Once we have
chosen the groups, we can record those groups in an additional col-
umn in the ﬁrst table (if we wish). Then we can simply copy the
cell data to form the QIT and SIT tables. (Note that because dissec-
tion is trivial for relational data, it is hardly discussed, which is an
appropriate thing to do.)
In contrast, let us now consider the private XML data shown in
Fig. 2. Given that we have chosen some of the data items to be QI,
and some to be SI, it is no longer obvious how we may proceed
from there to perform dissection and then move onto the task of
grouping to achieve the desired privacy property. It is also clear
that the task of grouping is now also more complicated: we no
longer just have SI attributes to contend with.
In the attempt to extend Anatomy to XML data, a number of is-
sues inevitably arise, which will be addressed in this paper,
including:
 How to transfer the key concepts of QI and SI to the XML
domain?
 How to derive the published XML schema from a given private
XML schema?
 How to extract data from the private XML data to produce
published XML data?fier table (QIT) (c) The sensitive table (SIT)
in relational microdata.
Fig. 2. Medical XML database data (private data).
Fig. 3. Proposed methodology.
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attributes?
 How to group the QI and SI XML data, given that they are now
parts of some hierarchies?
An overview of our proposedmethodology is presented in Fig. 3.
As shown on the diagram, the methodology consists of two major
tasks. The ﬁrst task is to derive the XML schema for the intended
published XML document (we will refer to this schema as the
‘‘published XML schema’’, or simply ‘‘published schema’’) from
the XML schema for the private document (we will refer to this
schema as the‘‘private XML schema’’, or simply ‘‘private schema’’).
This task is represented by the arrow going from A to B. The second
task is to produce the published data itself, based on the derived
published schema. This task is represented by the arrow going
from B and C to D.
We will use a running example to illustrate the concepts and
procedures of our proposed methodology. The starting private
XML document and the resulting published XML document are
listed in the online Appendix.2 Fig. 2 shows a part of the private
XML document. As can be seen, the private data contains informa-
tion about patients: personal details (e.g. age, gender, name, etc.)
and medical data concerning various diagnoses (e.g. value for Icd
code) and procedures (Cpt rate and value). Fig. 4 shows the private
XML schema, Fig. 5 the published XML schema, and Fig. 6 part of
the published data.2.1. Method for constructing the XML schema for published data
Given a private XML document (or a set of XML documents),
whose information may be very useful for knowledge-sharing2 http://code.google.com/p/twitter-analytics/source/browse/trunk/XMLPrivacy/
onlineappendix.txt.and research purposes, the aim of our methodology is to publish
the information as an XML document in some suitable format for
public use. We approach this problem by formulating the exten-
sion of Anatomy for direct application to XML data. In this endeav-
our, the ﬁrst task, which is of central importance, is to determine
what the schema for published XML document should be.
To facilitate the deﬁning of the published XML schema, and to
avoid ambiguities, we present a formal model of the XML schema.
This formal model presents an abstract view of XML schema that is
relevant to the work presented in this paper. Essentially, we view a
schema as a labelled rooted tree, with the additional condition that
each node has a property called occurrences. ‘‘Occurrences’’ is a
term borrowed from the terminology of XML schema. If an element
E in an XML schema has multiple occurrences, then in an XML in-
stance (document) of that schema, E can occur more than once in
its parent element.
2.1.1. Formal representation of XML schema
Deﬁnition 1 (Formal Representation of XML Schema).
1. A tree is a connected acyclic graph.
2. A rooted tree is a tree with a node designated as the root. Thus, a
rooted tree is a tuple hG; rooti where G ¼ hNodes; Edgesi is an
acyclic connected graph and root 2 Nodes.
3. A labelled tree is one in which each node is associated with a
label.
4. An XML schema is a labelled rooted tree, with a function, called
occurrences that maps each node to a range of positive integers
(a range has a lower limit and an upper limit). More speciﬁcally,
we assume that there are two functions available:
 name : node# string that maps a node to its name (label),
and
Fig. 5. Medical XML database schema (published schema).
Fig. 6. Medical XML database document (published document).
Fig. 4. Medical XML database schema (private schema).
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negative integers (lower, upper) where lower 6 upper. For
convenience, we also assume that the upper can take value
1, which represents an unrestricted upper bound. h
Thus, for our purpose, an XML schema is a labelled rooted tree,
in which for each node, we can talk about its name (label) and its
occurrences. But that is only ‘‘half of the story’’. The other ‘‘half’’,
which also of crucial importance, concerns its practical usage.
When translating from an XML schema to its formal representa-
tion, we impose the condition that only the leaf nodes of the tree will
bear information.
It is important to make the following remarks about this
restriction:
 The restriction conﬁnes the non-leaf nodes in the formal repre-
sentation to the role of structure-information-bearing, and
exclude them from the role of data-bearing. (This restriction
allows us to later deﬁne QI-SI as sets of non-leaf nodes of the
representing tree.)
 This restriction will not result in any loss of generality. In fact, a
leaf node in the tree can represent a simple leaf node in the XML
schema, or a complex leaf node, or an attribute in a node.
Take the case of an attribute A of an XML element E. Then we
represent A as a child of the node representing E. Consider, as
a more speciﬁc example, an XML leaf element E with an attri-
bute A. This node can store two pieces of information: (i) the
value of the attribute and (ii) the ‘‘content’’ of the node
(expressed between the pair of beginning and ending tags).
Such an element can be formally modelled as a node that has
two child nodes: one to represent the attribute (whose name
can be the name of the attribute) and one to represent the con-
tent value of the node (whose name can simply be the string
‘‘value’’).
 This restriction is one on the practical usage of the formal repre-
sentation. It is a restriction that has to be taken into account
when we translate an XML schema into its formal representa-
tion. That is why the restriction does not appear in the formal
deﬁnition above.
2.1.2. Deﬁnition of context element and QI and SI sets
The previous deﬁnition is a representation of XML schema in
general (sufﬁcient for the purpose of this paper). It can be used
as a formal model for both private and published XML documents.
The speciﬁc structure of a schema of a private document is given,
and therefore, its formal representation can be taken to be already
given in any particular release of XML data for public use. As for the
schema for published XML data, it is our task to deﬁne it, which is
the task we turn our attention to now. Note, that the concepts to be
introduced in Deﬁnitions 2 and 3 are requirements for an input
XML document to be privacy protected. These constraints also ex-
ists for other privacy models, including l-diversity and Anatomy.
For relational data, this task is easy to accomplish. Consider the
example shown in Fig. 1, the schema for published data can be read
directly, to a large extent, from the QIT and SIT tables there pre-
sented. Those tables contain information about both the meta-data
(the schema) and the data. But what would be the equivalent for
XML?
Obviously, to answer that question, we need to extend the con-
cepts of QI and SI for XML data. Behind these concepts is the con-
cept of an ‘‘individual’’, which is obvious in the case of relational
data. Each row of the ﬁrst table in Fig. 1 is the data of an individual
– a patient. Each row of this table, of course, contains, the QI and SI
data of an individual before the dissection. After the dissection
(and grouping), each row of table QIT belongs to some (and thesame) individual; similarly for each row of table SIT. Thus, for rela-
tional data, at least for the simple case of this example, data items
that are in the same row belongs to the same individual.
For XML data, of course, we can no longer have the ‘‘being on
the same row’’ mechanism at our disposal. Thus, we need to some-
how capture the concept of ‘‘individual’’, so that we can say that
certain data belongs to the same individual.
Our proposed solution to this problem is the concept of context
element (for want of a better term). Intuitively, the context element
is the node such that all the data in its subtree belongs to the same
‘‘individual’’. The formal deﬁnition of this concept is very simple.
Deﬁnition 2 (Context Element). Given a tree representing a private
XML schema, the context element is a designated XML schema
element whose occurrence is (0,1). h
Admittedly, at ﬁrst sight, the deﬁnition does not seem to make
much sense. To clarify the idea behind the deﬁnition, it is necessary
for us to make the following points:
 As a consequence of the deﬁnition, given a private XML schema
(or its equivalent tree), we require the designer of the published
schema to designate an element to be the context element, and
all that we require of that element is that it has multiple occur-
rences (that is, the occurrences of the corresponding node in the
tree is (0,1).
 We require the context element to have multiple occurrences to
ensure that a conforming XML document can have many
instances for this element.
 However, as far as the practical usage of the deﬁnition is con-
cerned, that designated element should represent the individu-
als of interest, whose sub-elements contain the related QI and
SI. In fact, as will be seen in the next deﬁnition, we require
the QI and SI elements to have the context element as a com-
mon ancestor.
Note that this point is about the usage of the deﬁnition, and
therefore it is not included in the formal deﬁnition itself.Example. In our running example (see Fig. 4), the elementMedical
DB Message is to be designated as the context element.
Having deﬁned the context element, we can now give the for-
mal deﬁnition of QI and SI elements. Intuitively, once the context
element has been identiﬁed, all we need to do to specify QI and
SI data is to point out which leaf element represents a QI item,
and which represents an SI item.
Deﬁnition 3 (QI and SI Sets). Given a tree representing the private
XML schema with a context element, the sets of QI and SI elements
are two designated set of nodes which satisfy the following
conditions:(i) The two sets are disjoint.
(ii) The nodes in the two sets have the context element as a
common ancestor.
(iii) The nodes in the two sets are leaf nodes. h
The ﬁrst condition is obvious: a QI element cannot be an SI ele-
ment and vice versa. The second condition allows the interpreta-
tion that the QI and SI elements are related to the same
individual. The third condition means that QI and SI elements are
data-holding elements, not structuring ones. By specifying leaf ele-
ments we automatically include the paths that lead to those ele-
ments. This substantially simpliﬁes the deﬁnition (without loss of
information).
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of (dark-shaded) elements Gender, Postcode, and Occupation, and
the SI set is the set of elements (Icd code) value, and (Cpt) @Rate.2.1.3. Deﬁnition of XML schema for published data
We now consider the deﬁnition of the XML Schema of Published
Data. Let us have a look at Fig. 5, which can give us an idea of the
overall structure of the published schema. We can divide the sche-
ma into three parts. The non-shaded part at the top (consisting of
nine nodes) shows that we structure the published data into two
types of groups: one type of groups for QI data (on the left) and
one for SI data (on the right). The shaded part on the left shows
the structure of QI data, and the shaded part on the right, the struc-
ture of the SI data.
As will be seen, to describe the QI and SI part of the published
schema, we will use the concept of ‘‘fragment’’. This is a concept
taken from the XML ﬁeld. In the context of XML, a fragment is a
‘‘path’’ from one element to a leaf element. The term has the same
meaning when applied to the tree representing the XML schema or
XML document.
As it turns out, the complete mathematical deﬁnition is quite
detailed and the features may be obscured by those details. To save
space and better expose the ideas, we present an outline of the def-
inition of published schema.
Note: By viewing an XML schema as a rooted tree, we inherit a
number of standard useful concepts (functions), which are very
useful when we wish to perform the complete formalisation of
the deﬁnition outlined below. These functions include: level (n): le-
vel of a node n within the tree (level of root is 0); parent (n): parent
node of node n; ancestors (n): the set of ancestors of node n;
descendants (n): the set of descendants of node n; leaf (n): true if
n has no children, false otherwise; path (a, d): the path from node
a to node d as a sequence of nodes with edges connecting them;
height (tree): length of longest path; and a common ancestor of a
set of nodes; etc.
Deﬁnition 4 (The Schema for Published Data – Outline:). Given the
following3:
(i) A tree TS that represents the XML schema of private data.
(ii) The designated context element.
(iii) The designated sets of QI and SI.
(iv) The name for the root element of the published XML schema.
The schema for the published data is a tree that has three parts
(as can be seen in the example shown in Fig. 5):
 The upper part. This part consists of 9 nodes and their edges.
The 9 nodes are:
– The root node (e.g. node ‘‘Medical DB published’’ in Fig. 5).
– QI-Group node (e.g. node ‘‘Group’’ on the left).
– QI-Type node (e.g. node ‘‘@Type’’ on the left).
– QI-Group-Element node (e.g. node ‘‘Group element’’ on the
left).
– QI-Id node (e.g. node ‘‘@Id’’ on the left).
– SI-Group node (e.g. node ‘‘Group’’ on the right).
– SI-Type node (e.g. node ‘‘@Type’’ on the right).
– SI-Group-Element node (e.g. node ‘‘Group element’’ on the
right).
– SI-Id node (e.g. node ‘‘@Id’’ on the right).
This part of the tree, considered as a graph, can be deﬁned directly.
That is, we deﬁne each node, with its name and occurrences, and3 In the algorithm to extract the published XML data, presented later, the items
given here are part of the inputs for that algorithm.we can deﬁne the edges as pairs of nodes.
For example, we can deﬁne the root as node R such that name
(R) = the fourth input item (e.g. ‘‘Medical DB published’’) and occur-
rences (R) = (1,1). We can deﬁne the qi_group node as node QIG
such that name (QIG) = ‘‘Group’’ and occurrences (QIG) = (0,1).
Then we deﬁne the edge connecting these two nodes as (R, QIG).
Similarly, we can deﬁne all the other nodes and edges. And ﬁnally
we include those nodes and edges in the tree representing the pub-
lished XML schema, i.e. with nodes ¼ fR;QIG; . . .g and
edges ¼ fðR;QIGÞ; . . .g.
 The QI part. This part consists of the subtree below the QI-
Group-Element node (see Fig. 5). To construct this part, ﬁrst
we extract from the TS tree all the fragments that consist of
the QI-elements and all their ancestors up to, but not including,
the context element. We then attach these fragments as sub-
trees of the QI-Group-Element node in the TP tree.
Note on formalisation details: From TS, we can extract the QI-
fragments as follows. For a given QI-node, we can extract all its
ancestors, call this set X. We can also extract all the ancestors of
the context element, call this set Y. Then
X n ðY S fcontext elementgÞ gives us all ancestors A of the QI
nodes up to, but not including, the context element. We can
now restrict the graph TS to nodes in A
S ftheQINodeg and we
get the fragments for that QI-node. In this way, we can extract
all the desired fragments, as a graph, call it F. For each fragment
in F, we can get the top element, the one that has no parent. For
each top element top of a fragment, we can deﬁne an edge
(QI_Group_Element, top). Adding the fragments and the edges
(connecting top element to the QI_Group_Element nodes) to
the graph representing the upper part, we get the tree consist-
ing of the upper part and the QI part.
 The SI part. We repeat what we did for the QI part to get the SI
fragments. Similarly, we can attach each fragment to the tree of
the upper part and QI part to obtain the ﬁnal TP tree for the pub-
lished data. Pairs of corresponding QI and SI groups are linked
by a common @Id as depicted in Fig. 5. h
At this point, we may ask this important question: In the deﬁni-
tion of the schema for published XML data, as outlined above,
where does the satisfaction of the chosen privacy property come
in? For example, suppose we want to achieve l-diversity, then
where would the satisfaction of l-diversity come into the picture?
The answer is that, as far as the deﬁnition above is concerned, it
does not come into the picture at all: it is simply irrelevant at this
point.
To see more clearly why this is the case, it is useful to consider
the analogous situation for relational data. The schema for pub-
lished XML data, complex as it may appear, is equivalent to the
relational schema for tables QIT and SIT in Fig. 1. This relational
schema is manifested by the column names of the two tables.
The grouping of the QI and SI rows is irrelevant to the structures
of the two tables. It is only when we ﬁll the QIT and SIT tables with
data that the satisfaction of the chosen privacy property comes into
effect, which results in the cells of columns Group-ID of the two
table being ﬁlled with speciﬁc group IDs.
In the same way, for the XML domain, it is only when we
construct the published XML document (which we will cover
next) that the effect of the chosen privacy property comes into
being.2.2. Method for constructing published data
Before considering a speciﬁcation for published XML data, let us
have a look at the published XML document shown in Fig. 6. We
can observe that it has two parts.
4 Sometimes, the ‘‘value’’ in the name-value pair can be a set of values. As an
example, Fig. 2 shows a patient with two occupations, Teacher and Photographer.
Because Occupation is a QI item, and the d-dependency property (that we choose) is
only concerned with SI data for grouping, we can accommodate the multiple values
for Occupation (see the result shown in Fig. 6 and the online Appendix). In this case,
value (in the name-value pair) can be a set.
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the structure of published XML schema shown in Fig. 5. This part
does not depend on the actual data in the private XML document.
The second part, which is shaded, is where we actually have the
data. The main task of producing published XML document is to
populate this second part with appropriate data. How are we to
do that?
To express the key idea in populating the published XML docu-
ment, it is convenient to deﬁne a few terms.
 By ‘‘schema-QI-fragment’’, we mean a fragment in the pub-
lished schema which goes from the context element, but
excluding the context element, to a QI-element. An example
of a schema-QI-fragment is the fragment Patient–Address–Post-
code in the schema in Fig. 5.
 By ‘‘instance-QI-fragment’’, we mean a fragment in the private
or public document that is corresponding to a schema-QI-frag-
ment in the published schema. An example is the fragment
Patient–Address–Postcode: 3003 in the private document in
Fig. 2, and the fragment of the same content in the published
document in Fig. 6.
Note that it is possible for us to identify an instance-fragment in
the private document that corresponds to a schema-fragment in
the published schema because of the shared fragment structures
between the private schema and thepublished schema. For conve-
nience, we will refer to this property as ‘‘shared fragment
property’’.
 Similarly for the terms ‘‘schema-SI-fragment’’ and ‘‘instance-SI-
fragment’’.
Now the key idea to populate the published document is:
1. First extract the instance-fragments (from the private XML doc-
ument) that are corresponding to the schema-QI-fragments and
schema-SI-fragments (in the published XML schema).
2. Then attach these instance-QI-fragments and instance-SI-frag-
ments to the various groups in the published XML document.
To facilitate the stating of the deﬁnition of the targeted pub-
lished XML data, we ﬁnd that it is useful to make three
assumptions.
The ﬁrst is about instance-fragments and the corresponding
schema-fragments. Given an XML schema, an XML document (in-
stance of the XML schema), and a schema-fragment in the XML
schema, one thing we need to do is to identify all the instance-frag-
ments in the document that correspond to the schema-fragment in
the schema. To save space, and because it is a problem in the XML
domain in general, we will assume that it can be done. From the
formal point of view, it means that we assume that there is a func-
tion (called fragments),
fragmentsðschema; instance; schema-fragmentÞ
that takes three arguments: a schema, an instance of the schema,
and a schema-fragment in the schema, and returns all the instance-
fragments in the instance corresponding to schema-fragment.
The second assumption is that, given an instance-QI-fragment
or instance-SI-fragment, we can map it to a pair of (name, value),
where the name depends on the corresponding schema-QI or sche-
ma-SI-fragment, and the value is the value of the leaf element of
the instance-fragment. In other words, formally, we assume that
there is a function
convert : instance QI fragmentðor instance SI fragmentÞ# ðname;valueÞ
For practical computation, the name can be taken as pathname of
the schema-fragment. For example, the instance fragment Patient-Address-Postcode in Fig. 6 would be mapped to the name-value pair
of ðPatient:Address:Postcode;3003Þ. 4
The third assumption is about the satisfaction of the privacy
property. We will assume that, with respect to a chosen privacy
property, given a pair of QI and SI tables, we can tell if the pair sat-
isﬁes the chosen privacy property. Formally, we assume that there
is function
satisfy : ðQI table; SI tableÞ# boolean
where the QI and SI table has an attribute to indicate which group a
row belongs to. More will be said about the role that this function
plays – especially in the design of our algorithm.
A formal deﬁnition of the published XML data can now be given.
Deﬁnition 5 (Published XML Document). Given the followings(i) a schema TS (‘‘S’’ stands for ‘‘secret’’, which means ‘‘private’’),
(ii) the designated context element,
(iii) the sets of QI and SI elements (in TS),
(iv) an instance DS of TS, and
(v) a chosen privacy property, which plays its role via function
satisfy.
Let TP be the schema of the published data. Now suppose DP is
the document/instance of the published data. Then DP must satisfy
the following conditions:1. DP is an instance of TP , where TP is the derived published
schema.
2. Let qif be a schema QI-fragment in the published schema
(which matches a QI-fragment in the private schema, and
which is possible due to the shared fragment property), then
every instance fragment of fragmentsðTS;DP; qif Þ must appear
once and only once in th published document DP .
This condition means that each instance-QI-fragment must
appear in a QI-group according to the structure imposed by
the published schema.
3. Similarly for SI-fragments. Thus, each instance-SI-fragment
must appear in one of the SI-groups.
4. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the QI-groups
and SI-groups in the published document DP by the means of
QI-Id and SI-Id nodes (as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4). (Note that this
condition is not imposed by the published schema.)
5. And ﬁnally, the QI and SI groups must satisfy the chosen privacy
property. More speciﬁcally, given a pair of sets of QI-groups and
SI-groups in XML format,
 First, by virtue of function convert, we map these two sets
into a QI table and an SI table. For each instance-fragment
ifr; convertðifrÞ will give it a name and a value. The name
will be the column name and the value will be the value of
the cell.
 Then, by virtue of function satisfy, we can tell if the pair of QI
and SI tables satisﬁes the chosen privacy purpose or not. h
Note that the deﬁnition is declarative in nature. We simply list
the conditions that a published document must satisfy to be qual-
iﬁed as the one to be obtained from the given private schema, the
context element, the QI and SI sets of element, and a private XML
document.
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condition is done as follows. First we collect all the instance-QI and
instance-SI fragments. Then we use the techniques presented
above for function convert to convert each fragment into a name-
value pair. Using those name-value pairs, we construct the equiv-
alent QI and SI tables, which at this stage do not include the values
for group ID. We then use the privacy technique, inherited from
relational data work (e.g. for l-diversity) or otherwise provided
(e.g. for d-dependency), to ‘‘bucket’’ the rows of the QI and SI tables
into groups. Then based on this grouping, we attach the instance-
QI and instance-SI fragments to their respective groups in the pub-
lished XML document. Thus, in the deﬁnition above, function sat-
isfy is used simply as an oracle to state the constraint that the
published XML document must satisfy the nominated privacy
property. And in the algorithm, which is the actual construction
of the published document, we must ensure that this is the case.
2.3. Method for enhancing privacy protection with d-dependency
We propose a new privacy protection property d-dependency,
which seeks to exploit the semantics of sensitive information to im-
prove on the privacy protection of published data. To clarify the
motivation for d-dependency, we provide the following example
where, Lung Diseases and Inﬂuenza are the SI values of two individ-
uals in the data to be privacy protected. Existing privacy methods
such as Anatomy and l-diversity will treat them as different con-
cepts and may therefore group them into the same QI/SI group.
But the two SI values are both Respiratory Diseases (please refer to
Fig. 7). This means that if we selected the SI group that contained
Lung Diseases and Inﬂuenza, we can use our knowledge of the ICD-
10 disease taxonomy to infer that two of the SI values are in fact
the same, if we generalise them by one step in the taxonomy (hier-
archy). This generalisation reduces the degree of diversity.
Our review of related work shows that there are still no existing
dissection-based approaches that use sensitive information’s gener-
alised values to create QI groups in which SI remain distinct even
after they have been generalised [22–24]. Câmpan et al. [25] propose
an approach that has some similar elements to ours, but which is
based on k-anonymity and generalisation of the published data, only
considers thediversity of SI’s ancestors,whoseQI values are identical.
It must be noted that the technique proposed by Câmpan et al.
is not based on dissection, and as such produces groups where QI
and SI values are still combined. To produce privacy protected
tables, it relies on generalisation of QI values, which has the effect
that all QI values in each group are equivalent. However, forFig. 7. ICD-10 Disease codgeneralisation to be effective, it requires QI values within a group
to be equal or requiring little generalisation to prevent information
loss. This is a constraint because it means that the resulting QI/SI
groups satisfying p-Sensitive k-anonymity either have equivalent
QI values (best case), or, in the worst case, QI values were required
to be generalised signiﬁcantly and the resulting data loses informa-
tion value. If using our method, on the other hand, this problem
will not arise, as we can group any pairs of QI/SI, as long as the
SI are sufﬁciently distinct with respect to their ancestors. Impor-
tantly, our proposal in this paper does not require the user to
pre-conﬁgure the sensitive value hierarchy, while for the method
proposed by Câmpan et al. [25], it is required, representing an
additional constraint.
Deﬁnition 6 (Sensitive value hierarchy). A sensitive value hierar-
chy is a labelled rooted data tree (note, it is not a schema tree) for a
speciﬁc property in an application domain, such that:
1. Each label is a value for the associated property (e.g. I64 is a
value for the property Disease in Fig. 7).
2. Every label is distinct (no two nodes have the same value). h
It is important to note that the sensitive value hierarchy is given
to us by the application domain. For example, when dealing with
medical or patient records, the hierarchy in use may be repre-
sented by the ICD-10 disease codes and their respective relation-
ships. An excerpt of this hierarchy is provided in Fig. 7. From a
practical perspective, we are only considering hierarchies with sin-
gle inheritance, i.e. the hierarchy is a tree where any node (except
the root) has only one parent. Further, it is worthwhile noting that
other prominent papers [4,5,7] on privacy also use single inheri-
tance generalisation hierarchies.
Deﬁnition 7 (d-dependency of a set of sensitive values). Given a set
of sensitive values SV (in a sensitive data hierarchy), and let A be
the closest common ancestor (CCA) of SV. Then we say that SV
satisﬁes d-dependency iff for every x in SV, we have dðx;AÞP d,
where dðx;AÞ is the length (number of edges) of the path from A to
x.
As additional terminology, if a set SV satisﬁes 2-dependency, for
example, then we also say that it is ‘‘2-dependent’’, or it is ‘‘d-
dependent of degree 2’’ (or at ‘‘level 2’’). h
Note on d-dependency for unbalanced sensitive data hierar-
chies: Where a sensitive data hierarchy is an unbalanced tree,
achieving d-dependency for a data set that maps to the hierarchye hierarchy (excerpt).
Table 1
Parameters.
Input parameter Parameter value
XML document see Listing 1 in the online Appendix
QI group size 4
d to achieve 2
Hierarchy TS see Fig. 7
Context Element medicalDBmessage
QI Gender
Postcode
Occupation
SI Icd code
Rate
A.H. Landberg et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 77–94 85may be more difﬁcult, because the SI node values lie on different
tree levels on just a few branches within the hierarchy. While such
a scenario will inevitably constrain the maximum level of d that
can be achieved for the data set, our d-dependency algorithm does
support unbalanced hierarchies.
As an example, consider Fig. 7 and Table 3. Diseases Postenceph-
alitic Parkinsonism and Lung Diseases are on different tree levels in
the hierarchy, yet are grouped for privacy purposes. As their closest
common ancestor (the root) is three and two edges away, respec-
tively, a group of these two SI values meets the deﬁnition of 2-
dependency.
Deﬁnition 8 (d-dependency of a QI-SI grouping at level d). Given a
QI-SI grouping TP that consists of a number of pairs of QI and SI
groups (in a privacy protected data set), we say that grouping TP
satisﬁes d-dependency at level d iff every SI group in TP is d-
dependent at least at level d.
For the special case where a node is missing or has been
suppressed in the private data, then it is mapped as null value. As
far as d-dependency is concerned, the ancestor of null is also null.
The distance between null and any other value (including null) is
1. h
Case study in support of the improved privacy protection of
d-dependency. Using the algorithm that will be presented in
Section 2.4, we run it on the private XML documents of a case
study. Apart from showing how our dissection and grouping
achieves d-dependency, and illustrating the steps of the general
algorithm for the speciﬁc case study, we also compare the d-depen-
dency approach with Anatomy, an approach that resembles ours
most as it also dissects and diversiﬁes the data to obtain QI and
SI groups without generalising the data. We therefore believe that
a comparison against Anatomy yields a fair evaluation given that
XML privacy approaches are yet to adopt the notions of QI and SI
groups. Other approaches such as Personalized Privacy Preserva-
tion [21] or Privacy Preserving OLAP over Distributed XML Docu-
ments [26] employ generalisation as a tool to enforce privacy
protection and are therefore less suitable for a comparison study.
In this section, we will discuss how the general algorithm works
for the case study, and then we discuss the improvement that we
can gain from d-dependency in comparison to Anatomy. Later in
Section 3, more speciﬁc quantitative results for comparison will
be presented.
Given an XML document of the type illustrated in the online
Appendix, and given a sample data population as illustrated in
Table 2 that can be mapped into sample hierarchy illustrated in
Fig. 7, the d-dependency algorithm is to be applied with the input
parameters listed in Table 1.
The sensitive information (addressed by a combination of XML
element and an attribute) and their respective occurrences
throughout the data are both illustrated in the hierarchy in Fig. 7
and Table 2.
To compute the QI and SI groups for the above described data,
we aim for d = 2, and must therefore treat the most sensitive infor-
mation in the leaf nodes of the tree the same as their generalised
ancestors one tree level above. By doing this, we ensure that sensi-
tive information such as Cerebral Infection (I62) and Stroke (I64)
are not arranged into the same SI group.
To illustrate the method for grouping QI and SI such that the
resulting groups satisfy d-dependency, we outline the ﬁrst number
of steps manually, at each step comparing how an alternative tech-
nique (e.g. Anatomy) would have performed.
The initial step is to sort SI by their occurrences in the data, and
since the most speciﬁc values are being treated in a one-level
generalised manner, this must be considered when computing
the occurrences. The four most frequent SI are Acute Upper Resp.Diseases with a total count of 2 + 4 (Acute Tonsilitis) + 4 (Acute
Tracheitis) = 10, Movement Disorders with a count of 8, and Nerve
Root Disorders, Cerebrovascular Diseases with each a count of 6. As
can be seen, occurrences are being treated cumulative bottom-
up. The resulting SI group computed from this (initial) run of the
algorithm is listed in Table 3. Referring back to Fig. 7, we observe
that Movement Disorders and Nerve Root Disorders have a closest
common ancestor (Nervous System) that is not the root.
In comparison, the Anatomy algorithm would have identiﬁed
the four most frequent groups by their sole counts, resulting in
Movement Disorders (4), Hypertensive Diseases (4), Lung Diseases
(4), and Postencephalitic Parkinsonism (4) to be selected as most fre-
quent groups, for example. Acute Tracheitis with an occurrence of 4
could also have been selected as it has an occurrence equal to the
other (selected) groups. The difference in quality of privacy be-
comes obvious immediately, because Anatomy would create SI
groups with both SI items from G20-G26 (Movement Disorders)
and G12 (Postencephalitic Parkinsonism), which is its direct descen-
dant, resulting in an ancestor relationship that may cause a privacy
breach.
Table 3 illustrates how d-dependency and Anatomy performed
in comparison for the ﬁrst (sample) SI group that was computed.
Although the privacy measure d = 2 for both groups computed,
the SI group generated by d-dependency has a greater degree of
privacy since there exists no ancestor–descendant (type-of) rela-
tionship between Movement Disorders and Nerve Root Disorders,
as outlined in the ﬁrst column of Table 3.
With continuous computation of further SI groups (and associ-
ated QI groups), it can be observed that the Anatomy approach
shows random behaviour when computing semantically indepen-
dent QI and SI groups. As a result of this, privacy leaks are easier
to identify and individuals’ identities are easier to be linked to con-
crete and speciﬁc sensitive information because the values in SI
groups are not sufﬁciently diverse.
The case study illustrates the theoretical working of our ap-
proach on a sample XML document and input parameters and
shown that our proposed solution computes QI/SI groups with a
minimum of parent or close ancestor relationships, while maximis-
ing far ancestor relationships with the overall objective to achieve
node independence in all SI groups.
The beneﬁt of our approach as compared to Anatomy is that the
semantic distance within SI groups is always optimal, where Anat-
omy computes random SI groups with respect to semantic distance
and as such can only perform as good as d-dependency in its opti-
mal case.
As a ﬁnal remark, it should be noted that while d-dependency,
as described in this paper, is based on, and further improves the
Anatomy technique, it is equally possible to apply the d-depen-
dency privacy property in combination with other privacy tech-
niques that are based on grouping. For example, l-diversity could
Table 2
SI occurrences.
ICD-10 Description Count ICD-10 Description Count
G00-G99 Nervous System 0 G12.3 Postenc. Parkinsonism 4
I00-I99 Circulatory System 0 G50.1 Atypical Facial Pain 4
J00-J99 Respiratory System 0 G52.3 Hypoglossal Nerve Disorders 2
G20-G26 Movement Disorders 4 I62 Cerebral Infarction 4
G50-G59 Nerve Root Disorders 0 I64 Stroke 2
I10-I15 Hypertensive Diseases 4 J03 Acute Tonsilitis 4
I60-I69 Cerebrovascular Diseases 0 J04.1 Acute Tracheitis 4
J00-J06 Acute Upper Resp. Dis. 2 J15.1 Pneumonia Pseudomonas 2
J09-J18 Inﬂuenza and Pneumonia 0 J17.2 Pneumonia in Mycoses 2
J60-J70 Lung Diseases 4
Table 3
Computed SI groups.
d-Dependency Common ancestor Type-of Anatomy Common ancestor Type-of
Acute Upper Resp. Diseases Movement Disorders  
Movement Disorders  Hypertensive Diseases
Nerve Root Disorders  Lung Diseases
Cerebrovascular Diseases Postencephalitic Parkinsonism  
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dependency (in addition to l-diversity).
2.4. Algorithm for dissecting and computing d-dependent published
data set
We propose an algorithm that computes a d-dependent pub-
lished XML document, based on the input of a private XML docu-
ment with a context node, a set of QI and SI elements, the group
size and a hierarchy into which the SI values can be mapped. The
goal of the algorithm is to group QI and SI nodes in such a way that
they satisfy the d-dependency privacy property (diversiﬁcation)
and separate QI and SI nodes so that there is no direct link between
them (dissection). This is achieved by repeating steps 2–4 of the
algorithm multiple times, each time attempting to increase d by
1. If after an iteration d-dependency cannot be achieved, the algo-
rithm will stop.
Initially, the target d to be achieved is set to the height of the
hierarchy, as this is the maximum degree of d that can possibly
be achieved. The algorithm will then attempt to achieve 1-depen-
dency, 2-dependency, and so on, until either the target d, or the
highest possible d, has been achieved. The algorithm starts by iden-
tifying the SI node in the XML document, whose value is closest to
the root in the hierarchy, i.e. the most general SI node, where the
bottom of the hierarchy represents speciﬁc values and the root
the most general value.
The ﬁrst iteration will therefore try to achieve the lowest d pos-
sible, grouping all SI nodes of the XML document into groups of N,
based on their ancestors’ values. Ancestors in this context refers to
the values that are obtained by mapping an SI node from the XML
document into the hierarchy, then generalising it d times. While in
the best case, CCA will be a multiple of N and have an even distri-
bution so that all context nodes in CCA can be dispersed to SI
groups where each SI value is distinct, this may not always be
the case in practice. For example, CCA may not be a multiple of
N, in which case there will be residual nodes that need to be dealt
with. Anatomy does this by dispersing them to existing, random SI
groups. Line 21 in our algorithm assigns the residual SI nodes to
existing groups that have the least number of that SI node (if
any), which can be considered an equal method in comparison to
how Anatomy solves the residual node assignment step. As a re-
sult, the veriﬁcation step in lines 23–33 will fail in such a scenario,unless it is skipped for those groups that were assigned a residual
node.
Similarly to other related approaches that rely on grouping, the
group size N plays an important role in the privacy protection, as it
determines how many distinct SI nodes will be contained within
each group, and which has a direct effect on the probability that
any SI node within a group can be re-identiﬁed. Generally, this
probability is 1 divided by N. In our experiments in Section 3, we
test our algorithm against different groups sizes to analyse its
effect on the efﬁciency and effectiveness of our method.
For this paper, we provide a simpliﬁed version of the algorithm
that does not cater for multiple SI nodes per context node. This
means that in our example data sets, each individual has only
got one SI node. The following experiments are also limited by this
scenario. We will revisit this issue of multiple SI in more detail
later in the paper.
For the grouping step, it is important to know the distribution of
SI values in the XML document. This required statistical informa-
tion is collected in lines 7–11. We store each pair of all distinct
SI node values, together with that value’s occurrences in a collec-
tion of pairs. This step also stores the values and occurrences of
SI nodes’ ancestors (see lines 10 and 11), as we will need to group
SI nodes based on what their ancestor nodes’ values are.
The group creation step (lines 13–21) is implemented using a
priority queue where node values with highest occurrence appear
ﬁrst in the queue. In this way, new groups are created by selecting
the ﬁrst N nodes and assigning them to an SI group. The corre-
sponding QI group is also created at this step.
When grouping nodes based on ancestors’ values (see line 15),
the node assignment into groups still needs to fetch nodes actually
occurring in the XML data. This is achieved in line 17, where a ran-
dom descendant of the ancestor can be grouped. It does not matter
which node is grouped, as long as its ancestor is different to all
other nodes’ ancestors in the same group.
Once all groups have been created, the algorithm computes d of
all groups and re-starts with d + 1, if all groups satisfy d. Otherwise
the algorithm is ﬁnished and the published XML document is
returned.
In each iteration, the algorithm systematically groups different
SI nodes, depending on their ancestor relationships. For example,
in the ﬁrst iteration, only the SI nodes’ parents may be considered
for grouping, while in subsequent iterations their d-th ancestors
Table 4
Parameters of data and algorithm as used in the experiments.
Parameter name Default Description
n_ary 3 Cardinality. Number of child nodes per node
tree_depth 5 Hierarchical depth of SI. Number of tree levels
lvl_populated 2 Number of tree levels from the bottom
up that are populated with SI nodes
freq_min 0 Minimum occurrences for SI nodes
freq_max 5 Maximum occurrences for SI nodes
group_size 5 QI/SI group size
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whose common ancestor cannot be inferred unless the SI nodes
are generalised by d levels.
Some groups may or may not achieve the desired d in a given
iteration of the algorithm. This will result in the overall published
data set having the strongest possible privacy protection using our
approach. In the optimal case, all groups, and therefore the overall
resulting published data set, will be d dependent. In the worst case,
i.e. when d ¼ 0, then the published data still satisﬁes the Anatomy
privacy property.The Issue of Multiple SI Nodes. Generally speaking, privacy
protection techniques that are based on grouping and diversiﬁca-
tion of SI values (such as l-diversity and Anatomy) rely on a meth-
od for comparing SI values, to determine their (dis-)similarity and
group them accordingly. Where a data set has only one atomic SI
attribute, the comparison method is trivial, as it is simply a
string/character comparison method. If there are multiple SI attri-
butes, these can be concatenated and then privacy protected using
existing techniques.In the literature, papers discussing privacy protection of micro-
data generally focus on scenarios where there is only a single,
atomic SI value. Few proposed methods exist that comprehensively
address the special case where there are multiple SI attributes in
data that is to be privacy protected.
Machanavajjhala et al. consider this issue in their paper on l-
diversity [5] and brieﬂy discuss the challenges. The authors con-
clude that QI groups will need to be very large to support privacy
protection over multiple SI, introducing signiﬁcant distortion into
the data due to the generalisation technique that the approach is
based on. Xiao et al., in their paper on Anatomy [6], also mention
multiple SI and include it as part of their future work. Wong
et al. [27] claim that their method can be extended for multiple
SI attributes and also for SI attributes that have multiple values,
however no formal method, algorithm or experiment is provided
in the paper.
A paper that speciﬁcally attempts to solve the problem is pro-
posed by Gal et al. [28]. The authors propose an extension to k-ano-
nymity [4] and l-diversity [5] for multiple SI attributes, by
exploiting the dissection concept of Anatomy [6]. This allows the
authors to reduce the distortion of the data (as no generalisation
is used), but introduces a separate SI table for each SI attribute in
the data.
Existing methods addressing multiple SI treat each SI attribute
separate, i.e. they are not concerned with the constraint that two
or more SI attributes could in fact be similar, related or even the
same, which may have an impact on the privacy protection tech-
nique employed. To address such limitation, one can employ a
more advanced method to compare the sets of SI values. In the
XML domain, which we have been studying as part of this research
paper, sub-tree matching of XML fragments appears as a possible
method to achieve this. There are many proposed approaches on
sub-tree matching, with Augsten et al. [29] and Cohen [30] being
examples of existing papers that use tree edit distance as a similar-
ity measure between sub-trees. In fact, the paper by Cohen specif-
ically mentions use cases such as document similarity and
similarity joining of XML documents to which its proposed meth-
ods are applicable. We believe that sub-tree matching as described
in these papers, with appropriate extensions, will be suitable for
our purpose to compare sets of SI nodes in XML, with the objective
to create privacy protected XML data.3. Experiments and results
In this section, we report a systematic study on our proposed
XML dissection method and d-dependency privacy property. The
parameters and variables of the experiments are summarised in
Tables 4–6.
In our experiments, we selected the Anatomy approach for
comparison against d-dependency and the pure dissection method.
For the purpose of the experiments, we implemented both the XML
dissection algorithm, the Anatomy algorithm (based on the XML
dissection technique), and the d-dependency algorithm as in Sec-
tion 2.4. The objectives of our experiments are as follows:
Table 5
XML data sets: experiments conﬁguration.
Dataset Description Context node QI SI Group
size
nasa Astronomical Data: Datasets converted from legacy ﬂat-ﬁle format into XML and made available to
the public
dataset altname afﬁliation 10, 20, 30,
40, 50
title
initial
lastName
name
treebank Partially-encrypted treebank: English sentences, tagged with parts of speech. The text nodes have
been encrypted because they are copywritten text from the Wall Street Journal
EMPTY DT NNP 10, 20, 30,
40, 50
NN
IN
CC
JJ
protein Protein Sequence Database: Integrated collection of functionally annotated protein sequences ProteinEntry CCHU sequence 10, 20, 30,
40, 50
name
source
length
type
dblp DBLP Bibliography: The DBLP server provides bibliographic information on major computer science
journals and proceedings
inproceedings title year 5, 6, 7, 8,
9
author
pages
booktitle
url
Table 6
XML data sets: statistics.
Dataset Size (MB) Elements Attributes Max-depth Avg-depth
nasa 23 476,646 56,317 8 5.58314
treebank 82 2,437,666 1 36 7.87279
protein 683 21,305,818 1,290,647 7 5.15147
dblp 127 3,332,130 404,276 6 2.90228
5 http://code.google.com/p/twitter-analytics/source/browse/#svn%2Ftrunk%2
FXMLPrivacy.
6 http://code.google.com/p/delta-dependency/.
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effectiveness of the privacy property d-dependency, as proposed
in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. By effectiveness, we mean the d degree
that is achieved (the higher the d degree, the better the privacy
protection).
First, we measure the d degree achieved by our algorithm and
Anatomy for comparison. With our algorithm, the published
data always achieves the maximum possible d degree. In con-
trast, the Anatomy algorithmmay achieve some d degree purely
by chance, ranging from 0 to the maximum possible d degree.
Second, we measure the d degree of our algorithm, which is the
maximum possible d degree, as a function of varying QI/SI group
size, sensitive values hierarchies, even versus uneven distribu-
tion of data within the sensitive values hierarchy, and data size.
2. The second part focuses on examining the efﬁciency of the pro-
posed XML dissection technique as proposed in Sections 2.1 and
2.2. By efﬁciency we mean the runtime performance and mem-
ory usage as a function of variable number of QI elements and
group size. We believe performance is an important aspect, as
we want to prove that extending dissection for the XML domain
does not add unnecessary processing overhead. We want to
show that there is no reason why XML data should be ﬂattened
if it can be privacy protected in its native form just as fast.
All experiments were conducted on an Apple MacBook Air run-
ning the 32-bit Linux Ubuntu 13.04 operating system, with an Intel
Core 2 Duo CPU P7500 @ 1.60 GHz x 2, 1.9 GB main memory, and a60 GB SSD. The programs were implemented in Java 7 and were
compiled using Open JDK version 1.7.0_25. Our source code is
available at Google Code.5
3.1. Effectiveness of d-dependency to privacy protect data
We examine the effectiveness of d-dependency on real and syn-
thetic data. For the real XML, we use the dblp data set. For the syn-
thetic data, we introduce a number of parameters that we use to
generate a random data set with speciﬁc characteristics such as
distribution of SI values, sensitive values hierarchy, data size and
group size used for the algorithm. The population and distribution
of sensitive values within the synthetic data set can be modelled as
a tree based on the parameters as listed in Table 4. The program-
ming code pertaining to the synthetic data-based experiments is
written in the PHP language and can be freely downloaded from
our repository on Google Code.6
3.1.1. Objective
The objective of the experiments is to show that (i) the d-depen-
dency technique provides superior privacy protection to the Anat-
omy technique (Fig. 8), and (ii) produces near-constant privacy
protected data sets (Figs. 9a, b, 10a and b), which is done by mea-
suring d and graphing it as a function of the variables. The four
variables used in the latter four experiments were selected for
experimentation as they represent the most important properties
of a data set that a privacy mechanism must cope with. In the fol-
lowing experiments we will quantitatively prove that our proposed
privacy preservation model outperforms Anatomy, performs
equally well under varying data inputs, and is not constrained to
‘‘ideal’’ scenarios.
For each experiment, with the exception of that reported in Sec-
tion 3.1.3, we generate a random data set and run the d-dependency
algorithm against it. We also run each experiment for different
Fig. 9. Effect of the generality and branch-distribution of actual SI data.
Fig. 10. Scalability of privacy method with increasing data and group sizes.
Fig. 8. Effectiveness and efﬁciency of privacy protection.
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demonstrate how the approach behaves against this variable that
speciﬁes how many levels of generalisation the data can be pro-
tected against. For example, the tree in Fig. 7 has td = 4. This step
is repeated 5 times and the average output value d (depicted as del-
ta in Figs. 9a, b, 10a and b) is computed, which serves as measure in
all experiments and at the same time deﬁnes the quality of the pri-
vacy model.
Further, with the exception of experiment in Fig. 8, we measure
d for three different node fan-out values (3,4,5) of the hierarchy.
This parameter deﬁnes the maximum semantic complexity that
can exist within the data set, as it speciﬁes how many SI values
within the data set can be related to each other on each level with-in the hierarchy (i.e. how many SI have a common parent). The
graphs in Figs. 9a, b 10a and b represent different hierarchy levels,
where the top set of graphs relates to a tree depth of 6, the middle
set of graphs relates to a tree depth of 5 and the bottom set relates
to a tree depth of 4.
3.1.2. Experimental design
To examine the d-dependency privacy model and algorithm
with respect to varying data distribution and complexity of the
sensitive value hierarchy, it is necessary to conduct a series of
experiments against data sets of various patterns. We deﬁne the
patterns by selecting parameters such as how speciﬁc/general SI
values are, where in the sensitive value hierarchy they are mapped
90 A.H. Landberg et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 77–94(i.e. whether it is a balanced or unbalanced hierarchy), and
whether the sensitive value hierarchy is narrow and deep (very
speciﬁc SI, where few SI have common parents/ancestors) or wide
and shallow (many SI values that have the same parents/ances-
tors). As it is not feasible for this research study to collect real-
world representative data sets that correspond to so many combi-
nations of previously mentioned parameters, we decided to take an
alternative approach to our experiments.
We implemented a generic test data generator that ﬁrst creates
a sensitive value hierarchy based on input parameters tree depth
and node fan-out. An associated test data set is then generated that
contains sensitive data that maps into the hierarchy. This mapping
is done so that the resulting synthetic data satisﬁes pre-deﬁned
parameters such as occurrences of SI, speciﬁc versus general SI,
and distribution of SI, and corresponds to the data patterns that
we want to examine.
To ensure accuracy of our experiments, we generate 5 sample
data sets for each set of parameters. We then run the algorithm
with different variables against each sample data set, and calculate
the average degree of privacy d for each set of runs. The ﬁrst sets of
experiments, reported in Fig. 8, are run against real XML data.3.1.3. Direct comparison between Anatomy and d-dependency
The ﬁrst set of experiments is run against real data and bench-
marks the d-dependency method against the Anatomy privacy
method. The XML data set used in the tests is dblp, as described
in Tables 5 and 6. We applied our XML schema and data transfor-
mation model to dblp and ran our extended version of the Anat-
omy algorithm for XML data against the data set as conﬁgured in
Table 6.
The results are reported in Fig. 8. Fig. 8a compares the effective-
ness of the d-dependency algorithm in comparison with Anatomy.
For ease of comparison, we perform a transformation of the effec-
tiveness (measured by d degree). Because the d-dependency algo-
rithm always achieves the maximum d degree possible, we
normalise its efﬁciency to the value 1. For the Anatomy algorithm
(which achieves some d degree by chance), we compute the aver-
age d degree of the various runs, and use it to compare with the
effectiveness of d-dependency (which is of value 1).
Fig. 8b shows that d-dependency runs faster than Anatomy. This
is due to the fact that d-dependency is a more restrictive approach,
and only requires to consider the ancestor values of the SI nodes,
and not the SI nodes themselves, effectively leading to fewer com-
parisons and sorting operations.
The conclusion we draw from this experiment is that d-depen-
dency achieves improved privacy protection and at the same time re-
quires less runtime to achieve this.3.1.4. Effect of the generality of the actual sensitive data on the d
degree that can be achieved by the d-dependency algorithm
How the actual SI data is located in the sensitive value hierarchy
may affect the d degree achievable by the d-dependency algorithm.
In the best scenario, those actual SI data are located at the leafs of
the sensitive value hierarchy. The closer those locations are to the
root, we expect that a lower d degree will be achieved. In Fig. 9a
scenario in which we generate the data with a bias towards the
leaf, is given the value 1, and the scenario in which we generate
data with bias towards the root is given the value 5. In addition,
we also vary the depth td of the sensitive value hierarchy from 7
to 9. As far as this experiment is concerned, the randomness, even
with the bias, yield similar results. Even though this is not conclu-
sive evidence, it may indicate that the actual maximum d degree
achievable in practice is resistant to the degree of generality of
the actual sensitive data.3.1.5. Effect of the distribution of the actual sensitive data in relation to
branches on the d degree that can be achieved by the d-dependency
algorithm
How the actual sensitive data are located among the branches
of the sensitive value hierarchy may affect the d degree. The best
scenario is when the actual sensitive data are distributed evenly
among all branches, and the worst scenario is when they are con-
centrated on just a few branches. For Fig. 9b, the scenario in which
we generate data with bias towards even distribution is given the
value 1 and the worst scenario in which we generate data with the
tendency to concentrate in a few branches, is given the value 5.
Also, as in the previous experiment, we vary the depth of the sen-
sitive value hierarchy between 4 and 6.
Similar to the previous experiment, the randomness, even with
bias towards even distribution among the branches or concen-
trated on a few branches, yield similar results. As before, even
though this is not conclusive evidence, it may indicate that the ac-
tual maximum d degree achievable in practice is resistant to the
distribution of the actual sensitive data with respect to the
branches.
3.1.6. Data scalability
Fig. 10a relates to the third set of experiments that tests how
the privacy scheme scales with data sets of increasing sizes. To test
this, we generate data sets with a speciﬁc number of nodes, where-
by the parameter Maximum Occurrences (freq_max) along the x-
axis speciﬁes the maximum possible occurrences of SI nodes, and
the minimum occurrences is set to a default value of 0. Thus, this
parameter gives an indication of the overall size of the dataset as
it deﬁnes how many occurrences of any SI node there is within
the data.
As expected, the size of the data does not impact on the quality
of the privacy technique, where quality is the degree of privacy
protection d that can be achieved. For the three graphs in
Fig. 10a, the maximum d that can be achieved is 3, 4 and 5, respec-
tively. The results indicate that our proposed technique performs
very close to optimal privacy protection for data sets of up to
22,500 SI nodes.
3.1.7. Effect of group size
Fig. 10b shows the results of the experiments in which we
group the data into QI/SI groups of variable sizes (5, . . . , 10) and
then measure d within the groups. The starting value for this var-
iable was intentionally selected to be 5, as it (1) is consistent with
experiments in related research works [31,6,5], and (2) because
small group sizes are undesirable due to the fact that a decreasing
group size implies an increase in the probability of privacy breach.
Analysing the Group Size (group_size) parameter gives an indica-
tion of how resilient the d-dependency privacy model is to group
sizes. It can be observed that the degree of diversity d remains
near-constant as we increase the group size.
The group size is an important parameter as it is proportional to
the probability P of re-constructing an individual’s link between QI
and SI values because (in the optimal case) PðGroupÞ ¼
1=GroupSize. Further, we observe that a variable depth of the hier-
archy that represents the semantic relationships in the data does
not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the degree of privacy.
3.2. Efﬁciency of Dissection and d-dependency
This section seeks to prove the efﬁciency of our proposed XML
Dissection technique and the d-dependency algorithm. As men-
tioned earlier in the paper, we believe performance is a key con-
cern as we want to show that it is just as efﬁcient to process
XML data in its native format for privacy protection, as instead of
needing to ﬂatten it and re-assemble it for use by a relational
Fig. 11. Dissection runtime performance.
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described in Tables 5 and 6, outlining what type of information
they contain and how they were conﬁgured, i.e. which attributes
were considered as QI and SI. We will refer to the data sets as nasa,
treebank, protein and dblp, throughout this section.
For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the proposed method as
the Dissection method, and benchmark it against the Anatomy
privacy protection method. The two methods are denoted by Dis-
section, and Anatomy in the ﬁgures in this section. Since we are
not using any randomised functions, each experiment is run once,
and the absolute values are reported. We include the benchmark
against the Anatomy method for a fair comparison.
Note that we do not report on memory usage for the dissection
method as it is constant. Dissection by itself traverses an XML
document and, when a QI or SI is identiﬁed, the relevant context
path is extracted and written to an output ﬁle, i.e. not stored in
memory other than for the ﬁle write. In fact, the only memory
use Dissection has is to keep track of the path to a QI or SI, to allow
for computation of the context fragment.
These data sets are freely available for download7 to allow full
re-creation of our results. For each of the data sets, we selected a
set of at least 5 QI elements, an SI element and a context element
(the conﬁguration). As we are measuring runtime performance and
memory usage, it is therefore not important for the Dissection
algorithm which elements are QI or SI. The Anatomy algorithm that
is run for comparison is run with the same conﬁguration.3.2.1. Dissection runtime performance
The Dissection algorithm parses an XML document and, in real-
time, identiﬁes QI and SI fragments of XML data that it copies into
two separate ﬁles. This is achieved by keeping track of the docu-
ment path that is currently being traversed, which provides the
detail about the ancestry of a given node (i.e. the fragment infor-
mation). We run the Dissection algorithm against all three XML
documents with variable number of QI elements (1–5) and group
sizes (10–50). QI and SI elements are leaf elements in the
document schemas that contain data, while the context element
is an element that is repeated throughout the XML document.
We ﬁrst examine the effect of the number of QI elements in the
runtime performance measure. In Fig. 11a, we vary the number of
QI elements from 1 to 5, while the group size is set to 10, and
examine the total runtime per dataset. The same tests are repeated
for different group sizes, which we vary from 10 to 50, and results
reported in Fig. 11b.
In the Dissection method, the number of QI elements has a
notable effect on the runtime performance, as opposed to the size7 http://www.cs.washington.edu/research/xmldatasets/www/repository.html.of the groups. The reason for this is because for each QI, the
program must track and update the ancestry path, which costs
additional time such as for element name comparisons. We
observe that for the larger data sets this can make a signiﬁcant
difference. The parameter on the x-axis is then changed to group
size and we observe that it has no notable inﬂuence of the runtime
as the number of QI elements. This is because the ancestry path
computations are the same in each experiment, as the group size
is set to 10. It therefore consumes the same amount of time, no
matter how large the group size is.
Note on technical details: Both the Dissection and Anatomy
method is implemented as a SAX (simple API for XML) parser
handler, which means it streams the XML data and merely writes
it to the respective output ﬁles, namely for QI and SI elements
and groups. In Dissection, no analysis of QI, SI or context node data
values is required, so the only memory usage is for the ancestry
path element names, and is insigniﬁcant. We have therefore
decided not to report on memory usage for the Dissection method.
For Anatomy, the SAX handler also processes the streaming
(private) XML data in real-time, but requires more time and
memory to perform the computations required to achieve diversi-
ﬁcation of SI values within each group. We report on these
measurements in the subsections below.3.2.2. Anatomy runtime performance
To show how the dissection of XML documents performs when
a privacy property is used, we choose the Anatomy [6] method.
Anatomy ﬁrst introduced the dissection method to achieve privacy
in relational data, with an additional constraint with respect to the
diversity of SI values within each group. Since dissection is the
basis for our XML dissection method, we believe that benchmark-
ing against Anatomy provides a fair comparison. A direct perfor-
mance comparison between Dissection and Anatomy with
respect to runtime is reported in Fig. 13.
As stated earlier in the paper, our method will work with any
privacy protection property that is based on dissection, but we be-
lieve it is sensible to create a performance baseline based on the
approach that initially introduced the dissection method. We
therefore provide another set of experiments that runs the Anat-
omy algorithm against the XML documents. In these experiments,
the data is dissected and, in each group of n group elements, there
are exactly n different SI values in the best case. Note, that these
experiments are not measuring the effectiveness of privacy preser-
vation in XML (this will be addressed in the next subsection), but it
gives an indication of how much runtime is required to achieve
dissection in XML and therefore gives an idea of the efﬁciency of
the dissection method for XML.
Fig. 12. Anatomy runtime performance.
Fig. 13. Runtime comparison between Dissection and Anatomy.
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Fig. 14. Anatomy memory usage.
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method when the Anatomy privacy protection method is used. In
our experiment, the streaming XML data is analysed in real-time
and grouped in a way so that each group contains distinct values.
We observe that the algorithm is near-agnostic to the number of QI
elements. This is due to the fact that for Anatomy, QI values play no
role in how to create groups, and the constant runtime perfor-
mance conﬁrms this. We believe that the slight variation in run-
time is due to the distribution of SI values within the XML data,
and the circumstance that n distinct SI nodes may not appear in or-
der throughout the document all the time. Zhou et al. analyse this
issue in their paper on Continuous Privacy Preserving Publishing of
Data Streams [32]. We decide to investigate the effects of stream-
ing XML for privacy preservation as part of future work.
We examine runtime performance for Anatomy with varying
group size and observe a decline in time required to create groups.
The results are reported in Fig. 12b. This decline in runtime is be-
cause the group creation phase involves sorting a priority queue in
descending order, adding signiﬁcant overhead to the group crea-
tion. Therefore, with increasing group size, and therefore less
groups per XML document, this overhead becomes less and less
of a performance issue. Due to the scale, this trend is best visible
for the protein database but also exists for the other two datasets.3.2.3. Anatomy memory usage
For Anatomy we report maximum memory usage required for
varying number of QI elements (see Fig. 14a) and group sizes
(see Fig. 14b). We calculate memory usage based on the byte size
of XML fragments that need to be kept in memory. When a new
group is created, memory is freed up because XML fragments can
be written to the output ﬁles and removed from the program
memory. The memory usage for a relational Anatomy algorithm
is small and is linear with respect to increasing QI or group size be-
cause all that needs to be stored in memory is a pointer to the table
rows that may be added to a group when it can be created. In an
XML scenario, the program must keep in memory the ancestry
path to the QI and SI nodes. A factor that inﬂuences the memory
requirements for applying Anatomy on XML documents is the
structure of the XML schema and document.
We observe that for the nasa data set there is a notable increase
in memory use (see Fig. 14a) which is caused by the depth of the
document tree structure (see protein dataset speciﬁcations in
Fig. 6). The max-depth of the protein dataset is nearly 5 times more
than the other two data sets. As a result, more intermediary nodes
must be stored in memory where QI or SI are located deep in the
document tree structure. This also explains the sudden spike be-
tween QI = 4 and QI = 5 of the nasa dataset in Fig. 14a, where theﬁrst 4 QI elements are siblings and the 5th element is deep in
the tree.
By contrasting Figs. 12b and 14b we observe that there is a
tradeoff between speed and memory usage for achieving dissected
and anatomised XML documents in real-time. With increasing
group sizes there are more temporary XML fragments that must
be kept in memory until groups can be created, while the savings
in runtime are due to the reduced re-sorting of the priority queue
as described earlier. We conclude with a remark on runtime per-
formance and memory use of our method. If required, more mem-
ory can be saved by not storing the actual XML fragments in main
memory but on a disk, only keeping pointers in memory. However,
this will inevitably increase runtime. The fact that our implemen-
tation streams XML data, there is no possibility to ‘‘backtrack’’
through the XML document to re-create the XML fragments. On
the other hand, it is possible to re-create an XML fragment based
on the ancestry path to an QI or SI element, given that all element
names, attributes and their values are temporarily stored. The sav-
ing is due to the fact that the path will only need to be stored once
per QI or SI element.4. Discussion
We implemented our proposed XML dissection method and the
d-dependency privacy model and algorithm.We performed a series
of experiments, both on real XML datasets and on synthetic data,
and analysed the performance of the dissection method and the
degree d of privacy for four key variables. Experiments conducted
on real data were analysed in respect of varying number of QI ele-
ments and group sizes. The four sets of experiments on synthetic
data have been analysed across two dimensions, being depth of
the hierarchy TS and node fan-out values of TS. These two sets of
parameters give a coverage of different data sets with varying
sizes, data distribution and semantic complexity.
The objectives of the experiments were to test that:
1. Dissection based data privacy is efﬁcient and practical for the
XML domain; and
2. The d-dependency privacy scheme provides additional protec-
tion beyond current privacy preserving properties.
To test (1) we wanted to show that runtime and memory usage
are acceptable to warrant a real life application of XML dissection.
This is particularly of concern in scenarios where resources such as
CPU and memory are limited, such as mobile devices that are
increasingly used in place of traditional computers. Although
XML can have a far more complex structure than relational data,
it was shown that our dissection algorithm has linear runtime
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el would behave under different parameters including number of
QI and group size. As pointed out earlier, there is still much room
for improvement of the algorithm to make it more suitable for re-
source constrained environments.
To test (2) it was necessary to identify parameters that could be
used to describe XML data structures of various semantic complex-
ity and size. Experimentation with these parameters enabled us to
test that data sets could be re-arranged so that all new groupings
(QI and SI groups) meet the requirements of established and pro-
ven privacy schemes such as Anatomy, and extend these by incor-
porating our novel d-dependency privacy constraint. The
experiment results show that, when the d-dependency algorithm
is applied to data sets of different semantic diversity, data distribu-
tion and data size, and re-arranged into groups of different sizes, a
near-constant d privacy property can be achieved, which gives rise
to sufﬁcient reliability of the approach. We showed that d-depen-
dency prevents semantic relationships within the sensitive infor-
mation of the data to be used as a means to infer a connection
between sensitive information and individuals’ quasi identiﬁers.
5. Conclusions
We have identiﬁed that current privacy models for XML are
mainly based on access control and ﬁltering techniques, and that
these approaches are not sufﬁcient to ensure adequate privacy pro-
tection in XML data. Further, we showed that while a number of
strong privacy preserving properties are available in relational
data, these have not yet been applied to XML. Taking these re-
search challenges, we developed a privacy model for XML based
on the dissection method and a new privacy propery d-depen-
dency. We proved that our model exceeds existing privacy preserv-
ing properties as found in relational data and is practical in
application from a performance point of view.
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